Flight Risk centers on Maddie Silva. Popular, funny, and brilliant in a courtroom, Maddie's "take no mercy" approach towards the criminals she prosecutes has earned her the nickname The Shark. But when she loses her temper in a divorce mediation, comically threatens to have her soon-to-be-ex-husband killed and he turns up dead the next day, she has to go on the run and turn to a criminal she has been prosecuting to help her clear her name. Maddie's humanity and sense of humor remain intact as she is forced to compromise every moral she has — and question everything she ever thought she knew.
Status: In Development
Runtime: 60 minutes
Flight Risk - Flight-to-quality - Netflix
A flight-to-quality, or flight-to-safety, is a financial market phenomenon occurring when investors sell what they perceive to be higher-risk investments and purchase safer investments, such as US Treasuries or gold. This is considered a sign of fear in the marketplace, as investors seek less risk in exchange for lower profits. Flight-to-quality is usually accompanied by an increase in demand for assets that are government-backed and a decline in demand for assets backed by private agents.
Flight Risk - Policy Implications - Netflix
A moral hazard concern generally provides a rationale that government should not intervene in a financial crisis. The argument is that a market participant who expects government bailouts or emergency financing would engage in excessive risk taking. However, various government policy tools have been proposed to alleviate the effect of flight-to-quality phenomenon. The argument for government intervention is that flight-to-quality phenomenon is a result of insufficient risk taking generated by Knightian uncertainty. There is also an inefficiency issue generated by externality that supports rationale for prudential policy. The externality is generated when in presence of illiquid market, each firm forced to sell illiquid assets depresses prices for everyone else but does not take this effect into account in its decision-making. The externality also enables strategic and speculative behaviors of liquid investors. Caballero and Krishnamurthy show that central bank acting as a lender of last resort would be effective when both balance sheet and information amplifier mechanisms are at work. For instance, a guarantee issuance by government or loans to distressed private sectors would sustain deteriorating asset prices, bring confidence back in financial market, and prevent fire sale of assets. Brock and Manski argue that government's guarantee on minimum returns on investment can restore investor's confidence when Knightian uncertainty is prevalent. Acharya et al argue that the central bank’s role as a lender of last resort can also support smooth functioning of interbank markets. The loan from the central bank to distressed banks would improve their outside option in bargaining. Thus less efficient asset sales would not be necessary and liquid banks would not be able to behave monopolistically. Brunnermeier and Pedersen propose short selling restrictions and trading halts to eliminate predatory behaviors of liquid traders.